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In Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the
Supreme Court revamped the law concerning the Federal Arbitration
3
4
Act and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing
businesses to insulate themselves from class action suits by employees
and consumers. In Wal-Mart, the Court held that under Rule 23, a
class action case for intentional employment discrimination could not
proceed when the allegedly discriminatory decisions were made by
5
individual supervisors at different stores. The Court’s majority
rejected the lower courts’ determination that Wal-Mart’s nationally
uniform personnel policies could be challenged on a class basis,
instead holding that the discrimination was the result of individual
supervisors’ exercise of discretion and needed to be proven on an
6
individual basis. In AT&T, the Court further limited class actions by
upholding the ability of companies to include waivers of the right to
7
proceed as a class action in a form arbitration agreement.
Each decision has significant implications within its field
(employment discrimination law and consumer law, respectively).
Together, the two decisions allow companies to opt out of class action
liability through contract and make it more difficult to bring class
actions against corporations that do not use such contracts.
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4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
5. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
6. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 153 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
7. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53.
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Collectively, they reflect the belief of the five conservative Justices in
the majority that companies must be protected from litigation that is
large simply because companies are large. Rarely has the Court been
more explicit in its desire to protect big business than in its statement
in AT&T that corporations need to be protected from the “in
terrorem” effect of class actions resulting in settlement of even non8
meritorious suits. Implicitly, the conservative majority indicated that
courts cannot be trusted to manage large litigation, even if it means
that the state and federal laws protecting consumers and employees
will go unenforced.
Big companies, like Wal-Mart and AT&T Mobility, that deal with
thousands or millions of consumers and employees enjoy certain
strategic advantages because of their size. Similarly, class actions pose
certain strategic advantages because of their size. The current Court
majority has used its power to protect companies from big litigation.
In so doing, the Court has abdicated its responsibility to interpret
federal laws on employment, arbitration, and class actions consistently
with Congress’s intent to balance the interests of employees and
consumers with those of large corporations.
This article has three main parts. Part I discusses the importance
of class action suits in ensuring redress when numerous individuals
suffer relatively small injuries. Part II examines what Wal-Mart likely
will mean for future employment discrimination class actions. Finally,
Part III focuses on AT&T and its likely impact on class actions
involving arbitration clauses. Our central point is that although the
cases arise in different contexts and involve different legal issues, they
must be read together because both are premised on the same desire
to protect big business from class action suits and because together
they substantially limit the ability of consumers and employees to use
the class action to remedy illegal corporate actions.
I. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATE HARMS
With the rise of the large business corporation in the early
twentieth century, courts and legislatures developed the class action as
a procedural device to protect individuals from exploitation by large
9
entities. Courts and legislatures realized that large entities have
8. Id. at 1752.
9. Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History
of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 222–26 (1990). See generally STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987)
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incentives to engage in widespread but small violations of law because
their lawyers know that most people cannot afford to sue over a small
10
transgression. When individual litigation is not economically
rational, the threat of suit is not an effective deterrent to illegal
behavior. Reliance on enforcement by government agencies is not an
adequate substitute for private litigation, as even dedicated and
aggressive government agencies, such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or state departments of labor or consumer
protection, do not have the staff or financial resources to handle
11
millions of small individual claims. Absent a robust bureaucracy
dedicated to effectuating the consumer and employee protection laws,
class actions are an essential aspect of law enforcement.
Large entities, including employers and sellers of consumer goods
and services, face both costs and benefits as a result of the market
power that comes from being large. First, large entities have access to
legal expertise and have market power to use that expertise to craft
company-favorable standardized terms on which to contract with
employees and consumers (including arbitration agreements or forum
selection clauses, choice-of-law provisions, and limitations on
warranties). Second, large entities benefit from economies of scale. A
company has every reason to think and act in the aggregate—
squeezing a few extra cents of profit from each of its millions of
consumers and employees (including by legally questionable
methods) hurts each individual slightly but benefits the company
hugely. Thus, if the company wants to sell mobile phone service
contracts by giving away phones but does not want to pay the sales
tax, it will say the phones are free when in fact it is shifting the thirty
dollar sales tax to consumers, knowing that it will save millions of
dollars across tens of thousands of individuals. Similarly, if a company
adopts personnel policies that result in employees being paid a few
cents less per hour than required by law, in the aggregate it will save
(describing the history of class actions).
10. On the purpose of the class action, see generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE &
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2005). Sophisticated accounts of
the role of large-scale class actions in contemporary law include William B. Rubenstein, A
Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:
The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998).
11. As Chief Justice Burger stated, “[t]he aggregation of individual claims in the context of
a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government.” Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
An example of a government agency calling for private class action as a supplement to
insufficient government enforcement resources is described infra text accompanying note 103.
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millions of dollars in labor costs.
Even if it is illegal to fail to disclose the full cost of the sales
gimmick or to misclassify an employee as ineligible for overtime, most
consumers and employees will not sue for three reasons. First, most
do not know it is illegal, and even those who suspect it is illegal will
not bother to find and consult a lawyer because it is stressful and
time-consuming. Second, most employees will not sue their current
employer for fear of retaliation. And third, assuming they pass those
obstacles, no lawyer will take a case worth $30 or $300 or even $3,000.
A company may thus find it economically rational to cheat a
consumer or employee. In short, large corporations have the market
power and legal expertise to shade the law to their benefit, and they
have the incentive to do it in a million small transactions that add up
to big profits.
The risk, of course, that comes with size and uniformity of contract
relations is that when employees and consumers discover that they
have all been the victims of a similar wrongful practice they will hire a
lawyer to file a class action alleging that the practice is illegal.
Damages in a class action can be substantial, and the larger the
company, the greater the damages.
Just as the bigness of the aggregated profits from illegalities in
millions of small transactions tempts some companies, so too does the
bigness of class action damages tempt some lawyers. Some will file a
suit for the settlement value rather than to obtain meaningful relief
for every class member. Even those lawyers determined to recover
relief to benefit every member of the plaintiff class know that class
actions are sufficiently large and expensive to litigate that it may be in
the company’s interest to settle rather than to try to win it all. The
reality is that a consumer class action typically yields relatively little
for each consumer; after all, each member of the AT&T class lost only
$30.22 to begin with, and a successful class action will return only a
fraction of the original loss. Comparatively, the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees
are substantial. The image of lawyers being greatly enriched while
consumers get relatively little makes class actions an easy target for
political opponents. If, however, such class actions are conceptualized
as being about enforcing the law and deterring future wrongdoing,
then the lawyers are being fairly rewarded for protecting consumers
and preventing violations.
Large class actions have drawn criticism from conservative courts
and commentators that tend to worry more about the harms of large
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class actions to companies than the harms those companies can inflict
12
on consumers and employees. Progressive courts and commentators,
by contrast, tend to worry more about the harms of large companies’
policies on consumers and employees than on the harms that class
13
actions can impose on companies. The weight of scholarly opinion
strikes a middle ground, focusing on preserving the deterrent effects
of class actions to curb the incentives of large companies to act
improperly, while reforming the treatment of settlement class actions
14
to reduce the incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to act improperly. But
in Wal-Mart and AT&T the Supreme Court abandoned any pretense
of equilibration and handed large companies huge victories. The
significance, of course, is not simply that Wal-Mart’s employees who
suffered sex discrimination are unlikely ever to recover damages or
that AT&T has been unjustly enriched by millions of dollars. The
larger concern is that big companies know that it will be much harder
to sue them in class actions, and the unscrupulous ones will more
often make the choice to enrich themselves at the expense of
consumers and employees.
II. WAL-MART V. DUKES: AGGREGATE HARMS
AND EMPLOYMENT CLASS ACTIONS
Wal-Mart offered the Court a choice about whether to allow class
actions that challenge the discriminatory employment practices of
huge companies. The evidence showed that Wal-Mart allowed
supervisors to set pay within a range of about two dollars per hour
and that supervisors nationwide exercised their discretion to pay
15
women less than similarly situated men. The evidence also showed
12. E.g. Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other People’s Money, 35 U.
MEM. L. REV. 53, 54 (2004); James P. Feeney & Richard E. Gottlieb, Taming Class Actions:
Keeping Best Practices in Mind, RISK MGMT. MAG., Feb. 2005, at 10.
13. E.g. Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases:
Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193
(2008); Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 813, 835 (2004).
14. The scholarship on class actions is so voluminous that it is perhaps unwise to hazard
any statement about the weight of the authority. Readers interested in the debates over the use
and abuse of class actions might consult 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 10
§ 1754 (noting empirical studies showing that some criticisms of class actions were overblown in
that they were based on a few unrepresentative cases rather than the mass of class actions in
courts across the country) and § 1797.2 (on the advantages and disadvantages of settlement class
actions and the efforts to reform Rule 23 to minimize the disadvantages while retaining the
advantages).
15. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146–49 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Women were
paid less than men in every region, compensation disparities existed in the majority of job
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that Wal-Mart gave store managers discretion about which employees
to promote, and promotions were often the result of a supervisor
tapping an employee rather than a uniform process equally urging all
16
employees to apply. In the aggregate, controlling for all other factors,
17
men were promoted more than women. In some cases, men were
promoted over women with better credentials and stronger personnel
18
records. Quite importantly, the procedural posture of the case
(review of class certification prior to discovery or trial) meant that the
Court majority was not charged with finding the existence of this
discriminatory pattern; the issue was solely whether a class action
could be brought to challenge it.
Because, in the aggregate, supervisors setting pay for Wal-Mart’s
women employees chose a number at the low end of the permissible
range, Wal-Mart gained huge labor cost savings at the expense of
millions of women. But individual cases of wage discrimination are
expensive to bring, and the gendered pay differential (say, between
$10 and $10.50 per hour) for each employee over the statutory
limitations period is only a few thousand dollars—not enough to
justify the costs of suit. Similarly, it is expensive to litigate an
individual discriminatory-promotion decision, and the backpay
awards (the difference between what the plaintiff earned at the lowerlevel job and what she would have earned if she had properly been
promoted) are often too low to justify suit. As such, if the 1.5 million
women employed by the nation’s largest employer have suffered
unlawful discrimination in pay and promotions, in the aggregate, WalMart has saved millions of dollars in labor costs by violating Title VII.
But without a class action, it is not economically rational for Wal-Mart
employees to risk their jobs and happiness to file a lawsuit or for
hundreds of plaintiffs’ lawyers to take these cases. This is the classic
situation where a large corporation can benefit tremendously from
illegal activity and where only a class action is likely to provide a
meaningful deterrent or remedy.

categories, and as time passed, women earned less than the male coworkers who were hired at
the same time. Id. at 155. In total, women earned between five and fifteen percent less than
similarly situated men every year of the class period. Id. at 156.
16. Id. at 148–49.
17. Id. at 160–61. On average, women had to wait 1.52 years longer than men to be
promoted to assistant manager, and 1.48 years longer than men to be promoted to store
manager. Id. at 161.
18. Id.
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The Wal-Mart majority opinion is stunning in its activism and
impact on numerous features of employment discrimination and class
actions. First, it increased the difficulty of proving a common question
of law or fact under Rule 23(a) by requiring “significant proof” to
19
which the trial court must extend a “rigorous analysis.” This
essentially will require a determination of the merits at the time of
class certification. Second, it redefined the common issue of law or
fact under Rule 23(a)(2) to demand a higher level of specificity than
20
previously required. Third, it rejected the social framework analysis,
a dominant contemporary social science approach to understanding
how employment practices of corporations operate, as a legitimate
21
method of proving discrimination. In the process, the Court
22
suggested that the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
standard for introduction of scientific proof at trial also will apply at
the class certification stage of the litigation, which will greatly increase
the complexity of class certification determinations and again make
the decision of whether to allow a class action essentially a
23
determination of the merits. Fourth, it suggested that a companywide policy of allowing discretion resulting in statistical pay and
promotion disparities cannot be challenged under the disparate
24
treatment framework. Fifth, it treated a company’s announced policy
prohibiting unlawful discrimination as significant evidence that the
25
company is not in fact discriminating. Sixth, it held that company-

19. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–53 (2011). Cf. Wolin v. Jaguar
Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Commonality exists where class
members’ ‘situations share a common issue of law or fact, and are sufficiently parallel to insure
a vigorous and full presentation of all claims for relief.’” (quoting Cal. Rural Legal Assistance,
Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1990))).
20. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2541, 2550–52. Cf. Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172 (“‘The existence of
shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient
facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.’” (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998))).
21. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2543–54. Cf. Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F.
Supp. 2d 208, 214–16 (D. Mass. 2009) (admitting the testimony of a psychologist with expertise
in social framework analysis to prove workplace discrimination).
22. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
24. Id. at 2555–56. Cf. Emanuel v. Marsh, 897 F.2d 1435, 1439 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing an
employee to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by proving statistical disparities
within the workplace and a causal connection between these disparities and the use of subjective
performance awards).
25. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2541, 2545. Cf. Ridley v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 217 F. App’x
130, 138 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law,
despite the fact that it “maintained policies against discrimination and harassment and an Open
Door policy for reporting complaints of discrimination or harassment”).
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wide statistical evidence, including regression analyses showing that
pay and promotion disparities were caused by gender, was insufficient
to show class-wide discrimination. Plaintiffs would need to provide
evidence showing gender disparities at each individual unit based on
26
the managers whose decisions were the cause of the disparity.
Seventh, it held that to certify a class, plaintiffs must present
anecdotal evidence of discrimination by a significant but undefined
27
number of allegedly discriminatory decision-makers. Eighth, it held
that a suit seeking backpay under Title VII and, more broadly, a suit
seeking monetary relief in general, cannot be certified under Rule
28
23(b)(2). Finally, and somewhat enigmatically, it stated that the
Rules Enabling Act prohibits Congress from amending Rule 23 to
allow certification of a class in any fashion that would deprive the
defendant of the opportunity to prove statutory defenses to individual
29
claims, although precisely what this means for the future of class
action litigation is uncertain.
Each of these nine holdings or statements reflects a potentially
significant change in the law; many are a rejection of decades of
judicial precedent or respected scholarly argument about
employment discrimination and class actions. Although each merits a
law-review length analysis of its own, this article proceeds more
30
narrowly. We examine the implications of the portion of the Court’s
26. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. Cf. Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., 326 F. App’x 900, 909 (6th
Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment for defendant-corporation when plaintiff-employee
offered “statistical evidence showing that [the corporation] ha[d] never had a female executive
director or vice president, and that only a small percentage of its executives, all at the lowest
salary bands, [were] female”).
27. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. Cf. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d
608, 613 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs when they “presented anecdotal
evidence of specific instances of discriminatory policies and practices,” making no mention of
requiring evidence of a significant number of discriminatory decision-makers).
28. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. Cf. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418 (5th
Cir. 2004) (holding that “[e]quitable monetary relief is compatible with a rule 23(b)(2) class”
and that such a rule is “limited to the context of title VII backpay, a remedy designated by
statute as ‘equitable’”).
29. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
30. Wal-Mart has generated a mountain of scholarly commentary in the years it spent
wending its way through the federal courts. See, e.g., Kathryn Smith, Comment, What Do 1.5
Million Wal-Mart Women Have in Common?: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Class Action Certification, 52
B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 149 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/12_smith.pdf; Lesley
Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95 (2011); Bejan D. Fanibanda, Dukes v.
Wal-Mart: The Expansion of Class Certification as a Mechanism for Reconciling Employee
Conflicts, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 591 (2007); Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart,
10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355 (2006); Aaron B. Lauchheimer, Note, A Classless Act: The
Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 71 BROOK. L. REV. 519
(2005); Brad Seligman, Patriarchy at the Check-Out Counter: The Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
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ruling that increases the difficulty of challenging patterns of
discrimination under Rule 23(a), which provides that a class action
may be brought only when the class shares a common question of law
31
or fact.
A. The Court’s New Rules for Employment Discrimination Class
Actions
Rule 23(a) requires that a court find four elements to certify a
class action: (1) that the class is “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable”; (2) that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class”; (3) that the claims or defenses of the class
representative are “typical of” those of the class; and (4) that the
representative “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
32
class.” Traditionally, all that has been required for commonality is
some issue of law or fact that is shared among the members of the
33
class; distinct issues can then be tried separately. The trial court
found a number of common issues. First, it found that Wal-Mart had
“company-wide corporate practices and policies, which include[d] (a)
excessive subjectivity in personnel decisions, (b) gender stereotyping,
34
and (c) maintenance of a strong corporate culture.” Second, it found
that Wal-Mart had company-wide gender disparities in pay and
promotions that were caused by discrimination. This finding was
based on statistical evidence that women were paid less and promoted
less frequently than men, even when they had better credentials or
35
performance reviews. Third, it found company-wide gender bias
based on anecdotal evidence from Wal-Mart stores across the country
that supported the finding that discrimination, rather than the alleged
preferences of female employees to work for less money and decline
36
promotional opportunities, explained the disparities. The court of
appeals, en banc, likewise held that Wal-Mart had a national corporate
culture and general management policies that discriminated against
women. The court rejected Wal-Mart’s argument that the companywide gender disparities were simply the results of individual low-level

Inc. Class-Action Suit, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM 231
(Nelson Lichtenstein, ed., 2006).
31. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–52.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
33. 1-14A MOORE’S MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14A.23.
34. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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managers’ decisions, each of which must be proven and litigated
37
separately.
Ignoring the abuse of discretion standard of review normally
38
applicable to class certification decisions, the Supreme Court
rejected the evidence on which the lower courts relied. First, it found
that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence of nationwide gender disparities
39
was “insufficient” and speculated that the pay disparities between
men and women “may be attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart
40
stores.” Second, it found the plaintiffs’ expert witness not worthy of
41
belief and “disregard[ed]” his testimony about the ways in which
Wal-Mart’s personnel policies and corporate culture allowed gender
42
bias to infect thousands of pay and promotion decisions. Third, it
dismissed the 120 affidavits recounting evidence of discriminatory
statements and decisions as insufficient given Wal-Mart’s size and the
size of the plaintiff class. Having brushed aside the evidence of bias
and twice pointed out that Wal-Mart has a written policy prohibiting
43
sex discrimination, the majority found that the gender disparities
were the result of individual supervisors’ decisions and needed to be
litigated individually.
Apart from the majority’s selective parsing and weighing of the
evidence, its crucial analytic move was to define the nature of a
common issue of law or fact much more narrowly than the lower
courts. Early in the opinion, the Court rejected two exceedingly
abstract characterizations of the common question issue, neither of
which had been offered by the parties or any lower court: that all
plaintiffs “have suffered a Title VII injury” or “a disparate impact
44
Title VII injury.” Without discussing the merits of the intermediate
positions (which the plaintiffs argued and on which the lower courts
relied), the majority immediately posited an extremely narrow
definition of commonality: that the plaintiffs’ “claims must depend
upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of
45
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.” Later in the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 612 (9th Cir. 2010).
1-14A MOORE’S MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14A.44.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 2554.
Id. at 2555.
Id. at 2545, 2553.
Id. at 2551.
Id. at 2545.

FINALIZED FISK (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE FAILING FAITH IN CLASS ACTIONS

11/30/2011 9:40 PM

83

opinion, the majority framed the common question issue slightly
differently, stating “that Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of
discrimination,” which the majority rejected in the next sentence
46
because “Wal-Mart’s announced policy forbids sex discrimination.”
Subsequently, the majority rejected the lower court’s finding that
common issues of law and fact were presented by Wal-Mart’s strong
corporate control regarding employment and its nationwide
corporate culture, which led individual supervisors to pay women less
and to prefer men for promotion. The majority speculated that
individual supervisors might have exercised their discretion
47
differently. Elsewhere, the majority invented an alternate theory of
the common question issue: plaintiffs must establish “a uniform, storeby-store disparity” to show a common issue, and statistical evidence of
48
regional and national disparities did not suffice. In the next
paragraph, the majority concluded that, because the plaintiffs “have
identified ‘no specific employment practice’” that caused the gender
disparity in pay and promotions, there was no common question of
49
law or fact. As the majority put it, “the crucial question” in any
discrimination case is “why was I disfavored,” which the majority
imagined as an individualized decision provable only by evidence of
50
individual supervisors’ motives.
B. The Problems with the New Rules
The Court’s analysis was flawed on four important levels. First, by
focusing on the existence of a “specific employment practice,” the
Court conflated the disparate impact analysis (which requires proof
of an employment practice having a discriminatory impact) and
51
disparate treatment analysis (which does not). Second, the Court
failed to appreciate that it was not a coincidence that throughout the
country, Wal-Mart’s women employees were subject to discrimination
in pay and promotion; the Court ignored or did not believe all of the
evidence indicating that decisions by individual managers were
influenced by a common corporate culture. Third, the Court failed to

46. Id. at 2553.
47. Id. at 2555.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2552.
51. Aida M. Alaka, Corporate Reorganizations, Job Layoffs, and Age Discrimination: Has
Smith v. City of Jackson Substantially Expanded the Rights of Older Workers Under the
ADEA?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 143, 148–51 (2006).
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recognize the importance of the class action in providing a remedy
and deterrent against future discrimination by large corporations,
where, for a host of reasons, it is unlikely that individual women will
bring lawsuits. Fourth, the Court essentially ignored the standard of
review. As mentioned above, class certification decisions are reviewed
on appeal under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. In his
majority opinion, Justice Scalia substituted his own findings of fact,
granted no deference to the lower courts, and effectively engaged in a
de novo review.
The essence of the majority’s reasoning is obscured by the
meandering path of the opinion. Laid bare, the reasoning depends on
two debatable factual assumptions about the nature and prevalence
of employment discrimination in large organizations. First, Justice
Scalia said that, “left to their own devices, most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids
sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity
52
at all.” Second, “[i]n a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical
scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their
53
discretion in a common way without some common direction.” Both
of these are factual findings that the Court has no business making.
Decades of employment discrimination law are premised on contrary
assumptions, such as the idea that a pattern of inequality may be the
result of discrimination rather than preferences of women or people
of color to be paid less and forgo promotion. From these two factual
assumptions, the majority reached the conclusion that unless there is
an explicitly discriminatory policy, plaintiffs must prove individual
managers’ reasons for setting their pay or choosing which employees
to promote.
Because the overwhelming majority of companies now have
formal policies that prohibit discrimination, the result is plain: class
action intentional employment discrimination cases will be very
difficult to bring. If there is a small workplace where one or two
people make the hiring, promotion, and pay decisions, it will not have
the numerosity required for a class action. But if there is a large
workplace where many people make the employment decisions, the
Court said that there is not the commonality required for a class

52. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
53. Id. at 2555.
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action. It is hard to imagine the Goldilocks situation where the
corporation has just the right number of decision-makers for both
numerosity and commonality. The opinion thus sends a clear message
to big businesses that they do not need to worry about employment
discrimination class actions of this type so long as they have an official
policy forbidding employment discrimination.
Because of Wal-Mart’s size and notoriety, we know a great deal
about the effect of its corporate culture on its labor practices. As part
of its relentless money-saving policies, store managers faced constant
pressure to reduce labor costs. In general, regional managers turned a
54
blind eye to how store managers did so. Individual litigation would
predictably prove of limited effect to change this corporate culture.
Wal-Mart would simply pay the damages and discipline the store
manager if necessary, but nothing else would change as long as the
aggregate cost savings from marginally legal practices were greater
than the damages paid to an individual woman. Taking away the class
action leaves the asymmetric incentives untouched: Wal-Mart has an
incentive to pay women as little as possible, and individual women
working at Wal-Mart have little incentive to sue it.
III. AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION: AGGREGATE HARMS AND
CLASS ARBITRATION
The problem of asymmetric incentives is even greater for class
action waivers in form arbitration agreements. State supreme courts,
state legislatures, and federal courts have attempted to protect
employees and consumers by holding that especially onerous waivers
and agreements are unconscionable and invalid because they
55
effectively exculpate a defendant from liability. Corporations have
argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts such
56
applications of state contract law. In general, the question is when
54. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION: HOW WAL-MART CREATED
A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS (2009); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–52; DON
SODERQUIST, THE WAL-MART WAY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUCCESS OF THE WORLD’S
LARGEST COMPANY (2005); LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK
BATTLE FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004); Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price
(2005) (documentary film available online at http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/wal-mart-thehigh-cost-of-low-price/).
55. See, e.g., Mansker v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95638 n.3 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 14, 2010) (“[U]nder Washington law, class action waivers are substantively unconscionable
if they operate to exculpate a defendant from liability for widespread wrongdoing.”).
56. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1247 (2008–2009); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87
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arbitration agreements merely provide alternative forums and when
the procedural differences between arbitration and litigation amount
to waivers of substantive rights.
In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA
preempted the California law invalidating the class action waivers in
57
form arbitration agreements. Vincent and Liza Concepcion
purchased cellular telephone service from AT&T Mobility LCC
under a form contract providing for arbitration of all disputes
between the parties. AT&T had advertised the phones as free but
58
charged the Concepcions $30.22 in taxes. Their suit was consolidated
with other similar claims in a federal class action alleging that AT&T
had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on
phones it advertised as free.
AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration under the terms of
its contract with the Concepcions. The federal district court and Ninth
Circuit rejected arbitration, finding California law made such
contractual provisions unenforceable on the grounds that the class
action waiver was an exculpation of AT&T because individual
59
arbitration of a dispute was no substitute for a class action remedy.
The FAA requires enforcement of contractual arbitration clauses but
specifies that such clauses are not enforceable where state law
60
provides for revocation. The California law on which the lower
61
courts relied was the rule stated in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
in which the California Supreme Court specifically held that class
action waivers in consumer arbitration clauses were not enforceable
62
under state law. Discover Bank was one of a series of California
Supreme Court decisions finding certain terms in mandatory, predispute adhesion arbitration agreements to be unconscionable or
contrary to public policy because they exculpate corporations from
63
liability under state statute or common law.
64
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court held that
the FAA makes enforceable an agreement mandating arbitration of
IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
57. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
58. Id. at 1744.
59. Id. at 1744–45.
60. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947).
61. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
62. Id. at 1118.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60, 62, 64.
64. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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statutory claims because an arbitration agreement is not a waiver of
substantive rights, but only a submission of their resolution to “an
65
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Courts and legislatures have
held that arbitration agreements that limit remedies or operate as
66
waivers of substantive rights are therefore a violation of due process,
67
state substantive statutes, or general state contract doctrine,
including the law of unconscionability or the law declaring contracts
68
that exculpate parties to be contrary to public policy. But courts also
have held that the FAA preempts state laws that restrict the
enforceability of arbitration agreements unless the state law is a
principle of general contract law rather than expressly about
69
arbitration.
The issue in AT&T was whether the Discover Bank rule was a
principle of general contract law immune from FAA preemption. A
generally applicable principle of California contract law is that a
contract is void if it exculpates “the party from responsibility for its
70
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.”
Discover Bank held that a class action waiver “found in a consumer
contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages” is
an unenforceable exculpatory provision in a suit alleging “that the
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
71
small sums of money.” In that setting, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that the class action waiver was not a procedural difference,
permissible under Gilmer, but an invalid prospective waiver of
72
substantive rights. In Gentry v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court extended the Discover Bank rule to cases in which
employees allege wage and hour law violations, reasoning that
employment agreements are also contracts of adhesion drafted by the
65. Id. at 26.
66. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
67. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000).
68. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating an
arbitration agreement that imposed onerous procedures on the plaintiff but not the company,
that allowed the company but not the plaintiff to choose eligible arbitrators, and that allowed
the company but not the plaintiff to obtain judicial review).
69. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2011); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in
Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 52 (2004).
70. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
71. Id.
72. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007).
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party with superior bargaining power, also involve a small amount of
individual damages, and also involve a scheme by which the employer
saves a great deal of money by cheating large numbers of employees
73
out of small sums of unpaid overtime or minimum wages.
In other cases, the California Supreme Court has similarly found
that particularly onerous terms in arbitration agreements drafted by
employers or consumer product companies are unconscionable or
invalid exculpatory clauses that waive substantive rights. In
74
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the
California Supreme Court held that terms in mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are unenforceable for claims under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act if they limit damages
normally available under the statute, fail to allow discovery adequate
to arbitrate the claim, do not require a written decision of the
arbitrator, limit judicial review sufficient to ensure that the arbitrator
complied with the statute, or impose on employees costs unique to
arbitration such that the employee would have to pay more to invoke
statutory rights in arbitration than she would to invoke her rights in
75
court. The California Supreme Court later extended the Armendariz
76
rule to common-law claims of wrongful employment termination.
A. The Court’s New Rules for Class Action Waivers in Form Contracts
The impact of AT&T on this body of law in California and other
states is unclear. In AT&T, the Supreme Court, five to four, found that
77
the FAA preempted the California law. Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion gave three reasons for preempting the prohibition on class
arbitration waivers. “First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
78
procedural morass.” Second, because “class arbitration requires
79
procedural formality,” a class action is inconsistent with the whole
concept of arbitration. “Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks
80
to defendants.” The Court spoke of the “in terrorem” effect of class
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 682, 684, 689.
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 990 (Cal. 2003).
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011).
Id. at 1751.
Id.
Id. at 1752.
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action suits that pressure corporations to settle even non-meritorious
81
claims. This logic is faulty and its implications are problematic.
The majority’s first two reasons suggest that the FAA preempts
state laws regulating the process of arbitration in any way that
increases the litigants’ procedural protections, at least up to the point
at which an arbitration agreement so streamlines procedure as to alter
substantive rights. The contention is that arbitration is informal and
therefore that the FAA preempts a state law that requires any
particular procedural protections. This statement is an argument from
definition and, like all such arguments, is unpersuasive. What if the
arbitration agreement provided that arbitrators must resolve a case
by flipping a coin? What if the arbitration agreement eliminated
pretrial discovery? Simply saying that arbitration is informal tells us
nothing about why the FAA preempts state laws prohibiting excessive
informality. What Justice Scalia failed to explain is how to draw the
line between a streamlined procedure and a waiver of substantive
rights. Given that the opinion never addressed the Discover Bank
reasons for finding that class action waivers actually operate as
exculpatory clauses in certain cases, the opinion offers no reasons for
finding that the FAA preempts laws against class action waivers.
The third rationale is the most logically unsatisfying and politically
objectionable. First, its reasoning—that class arbitration waivers are
82
necessary to protect innocent defendants —is inconsistent with the
first two rationales, which were all about the necessity to streamline
procedure. The majority found prohibitions on class action waivers to
be preempted precisely because arbitration fails to offer defendants
sufficient procedural protections in conducting high-stakes class
litigation: there is no interlocutory appeal of the arbitrator’s class
certification, and there is insufficient judicial review of the arbitrator’s
83
ultimate decision. As the Court candidly admitted, “[w]e find it hard
to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective
means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would
84
have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.” Yet the
Court has no trouble in allowing defendants to force plaintiffs to
85
sacrifice the protections of the federal rules of evidence, the right to

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1747.
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a trial by jury, the right to a hearing in a public tribunal, the right to
87
proceed as a class, or the right to judicial review of arbitrator error.
Why is procedural informality acceptable when it forces the costs and
risks of litigation on plaintiffs but not on defendants? Because of the
bigness principle: the loss of an individual employee’s or consumer’s
claim—a claim worth perhaps a few hundred or thousand dollars—is
small potatoes (to the Court at least). But the loss of a class action is
worth millions. To the Court, it is irrelevant that a thousand dollars to
an individual may be a proportionally larger sum than ten million
dollars to AT&T.
Not only is the majority opinion inconsistent about procedural
formality, it is also grossly one-sided. The Court could not have been
more explicit that its goal was to protect corporations against
consumers who wish to vindicate statutory or common-law claims for
fraud or false advertising. Class arbitration is unacceptable because
the process “increases risks to defendants,” inasmuch as the
aggregated damages might constitute “a devastating loss” that would
88
“pressure[]” them “into settling questionable claims.” This assertion
of the need for federal preemption is outrageous as a statement of
values and deeply troubling as an indication of the future trend in the
law. Parties settle “questionable claims” all the time, sometimes to the
defendant’s financial advantage and sometimes to the plaintiff’s. The
whole point of arbitration agreements is to induce plaintiffs’ lawyers
to decline to bring cases because the risks and costs of arbitration are
greater for plaintiffs than the risks and costs of litigation when
balanced against the prospect of a recovery. Giving up the benefits of
a jury trial very likely causes plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle or abandon
meritorious causes because the chance of a substantial recovery is
greatly reduced; why should defendants force that choice on plaintiffs
but not be subject to a rule that forces the risk of class action
litigation on them? The whole purpose of the Discover Bank rule and
its application in Gentry is to protect plaintiffs from corporations’ use
of arbitration agreements as exculpatory agreements. The Court
offered no reason, other than straightforward favoritism for large
companies, why the FAA would preempt state laws intending to
protect plaintiffs rather than defendants. The Court reads into the
FAA a desire to avoid class-based remedies and a desire to protect
86. Id. at 1748.
87. Id. at 1752.
88. Id.
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businesses from class actions, neither of which is expressed or implied
by the statute.
B. The Future of State Limits on Exculpatory Clauses in Arbitration
Agreements
The impact of AT&T on Gentry—or even on the continued
viability of the Discover Bank rule—remains uncertain because of the
particular facts of the case. The Concepcions’ adhesion agreement did
contain a number of provisions to protect the consumer in arbitrating
small claims. In rejecting the Concepcions’ arguments, the majority
noted that the arbitration agreement was not likely to operate as a
89
complete exculpation of AT&T. One question is whether this portion
of the opinion is dicta or a limitation on the holding. The larger
question is which other state laws restricting the enforceability of
class action waivers and similarly onerous arbitration agreement
terms are preempted.
The arbitration agreement contained a number of procedural
protections to enable consumers to arbitrate even small claims. First,
it required the company to pay the costs of arbitrating nonfrivolous
90
claims. Second, it required the arbitration to occur in the county in
91
which the consumer was billed. Third, it denied the company the
92
ability to recover attorney’s fees. And fourth, it provided that if the
consumer received an award greater than AT&T’s last written
settlement offer, AT&T must pay a minimum of $7,500 plus twice the
93
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. In rejecting the lower court’s and dissent’s
concerns that denial of class arbitration in small claims operates as an
exculpatory clause because no one will sue for thirty dollars, the
Court pointed out that the $7,500 minimum recovery plus double fees
94
provision provided an incentive for plaintiffs to bring small claims.
The majority overlooked the fact that the minimum recovery would
apply only in some cases. On the other hand, the Court explicitly did
not frame its holding as depending on this feature of the contract.
Instead, in response to the assertion that class actions are necessary to
prosecute small claims, the Court simply said, “States cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1744.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1753.
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unrelated reasons.” It then went on the say that “[m]oreover, here
the claim was most unlikely to go unresolved” because of the
96
minimum recovery provision. Although the Court extolled the
existence of these other procedures, never did the Court discuss
whether they actually were used or how many arbitrations ever
occurred under them.
What the opinion left unresolved is the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement that waives class actions and contains no
minimum recovery provision in circumstances where the potential
award is too small to enable individuals to arbitrate their claims. This
is where the murkiness of AT&T causes trouble. The crux of the
reasoning in Discover Bank and Gentry was that a class action waiver
actually operates as an exculpatory provision where a class of
plaintiffs suffers damages that are too small to make an individual suit
feasible and where the defendant has an incentive to violate the law
precisely because it knows that individuals will rarely, if ever, sue.
Justice Scalia never directly addressed this analysis but did make
three points about it. First, he dismissed the “predictably small” rule
as “toothless and malleable,” noting that the Ninth Circuit held that
97
$4,000 in damages met the standard. Yet the fact that the standard is
malleable, and that reasonable minds can differ about the minimum
amount necessary to enable a plaintiff to find a lawyer to take an
individual claim, does not mean that most plaintiffs will be able to
arbitrate individual small claims and that a class action waiver will not
operate as an exculpatory clause. This is the logical fallacy of
composition: the fact that some applications of the Discover Bank
rule might be problematic does not mean that all are.
Second, Justice Scalia observed that the AT&T contract provided
a $7,500 minimum recovery plus double attorney’s fees if the plaintiffs
recovered more than AT&T’s final settlement offer, which he
believed would provide sufficient incentive for a lawyer to arbitrate
the case individually and would make it “most unlikely” that any
98
claims would go unresolved. Without this provision, claims likely
would go unresolved, and the class action waiver would in fact
operate as an exculpatory clause. But as noted above, it is unclear
whether this fact is necessary to the holding. As presented by Justice
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1750.
Id. at 1753.
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Scalia, this fact seems incidental, though it certainly provides a basis
for lower courts to distinguish arbitration clauses in consumer or
employment contracts that do not have such provisions.
Third, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Discover Bank rule—that a
class action waiver is unenforceable when the plaintiff alleges a
scheme to cheat consumers—was not a limit on when a court could
find an agreement invalid because “all that is required is an
99
allegation.” The opinion never explained, however, why the
perceived inadequacy of the limits in the Discover Bank rule means
that it is preempted by the FAA. Implicitly, the majority seemed to
think that in some cases the class action waiver would not operate as
an exculpatory clause because some lawyers might be willing to
arbitrate individual claims. But that conclusion rests on the same
logical fallacy of composition: the fact that some lawyers might be
willing to arbitrate some claims for $30 or $300 or $3,000 does not
mean that many would or that enough would to enable individuals to
enforce their legal rights. Data show that of seventy million AT&T
customers subject to the arbitration agreement, only 200 have
initiated arbitrations. As the Seventh Circuit said when invalidating a
class action waiver, absent unusual circumstances, “only a lunatic or a
100
fanatic” would litigate a case worth only a few hundred dollars. The
overwhelming majority of lawyers are neither fanatics nor lunatics,
and because AT&T presumably knew that when it included the class
action waiver in its agreement, the class action waiver does operate as
an exculpatory clause.
Imagine that AT&T decided the fastest and cheapest way to
process millions of small claims by disgruntled consumers was an inperson, face-to-face meeting between the consumer and an AT&T
claims manager. At such a meeting the consumer could present his
claim and have it assessed and perhaps settled before either AT&T or
the consumer went to the difficulty and expense of hiring a lawyer
and initiating arbitration. Imagine, therefore, that AT&T’s lawyers
drafted a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement requiring that
arbitration be initiated by the plaintiff in person at the company’s
headquarters. From AT&T’s standpoint, this is a legitimate costsaving measure that allows the fastest claim resolution. Consumers
99. Id. at 1750.
100. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
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will, of course, find the requirement an insuperable barrier to
presenting the claim any time that the travel costs exceed the likely
recovery. If the likely recovery is small in most cases, under the
Discover Bank rule, the in-person meeting requirement would be an
invalid exculpatory provision. Would the FAA preempt Discover
Bank on those facts? What if AT&T required claimants to do 150 onearmed push-ups before initiating arbitration? Nothing in AT&T
explains when or why the FAA preempts a state rule of general
applicability—a prohibition on exculpatory provisions in contracts—
that prohibits arbitration agreements from imposing procedural
requirements or restrictions that will have the predictable effect of
discouraging some or most claimants from asserting a claim.
Against that backdrop, consider whether the FAA preempts class
action waivers in the context of a specific statutory remedial scheme
that depends upon collective actions, such as those found in the
101
federal Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage and hour laws. In
Gentry, the California Supreme Court applied the Discover Bank rule
to class action waivers contained in employment agreements that
102
affected claims for unpaid overtime or minimum wage. Individual
wage claims are typically relatively small; a claim for failure to pay the
minimum wage could be as little as fifty cents an hour, which, over the
two-year statute of limitations period, would add up to only $2,000 to
103
$4,000 per worker. Many employees do not know what the wage
laws require, or cannot find a lawyer to handle the case even when
they know the company’s payroll practices are illegal. Moreover,

101. See, e.g., Nicholson v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming
refusal to compel the plaintiff employee to arbitrate his Age Discrimination in Employment Act
claim because “the ADEA is one of the statutory schemes that present [an] inherent conflict
with arbitration”), abrogated by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
The court reasoned that Congress intended the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
eliminate discrimination by maintaining a collective action, something that arbitration could not
effectively do.
102. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 563–64 (Cal. 2007). Under California law,
“notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the
legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled
to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or
overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of
suit.” Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a). The federal Fair Labor Standards Act contains similar
nonwaivable protections. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 2011).
103. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 564. As the California Supreme Court observed in Gentry, citing
data from the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, the average award from the
DLSE wage adjudication unit between 2000 and 2005 was $6,038. Id. According to another 2005
report, the average wage claim submitted to DLSE ranged from $5,000 to $7,000, and the
average settlement ranged from $400 to $1,600. Id.
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these claims are difficult to prove because most employees do not
keep records of the hours they worked over the course of several
104
years. They thus have to rely on their own memory and occasionally
confront employers who falsify payroll data to make it appear that
the employees have worked fewer hours or been paid more than they
105
have been.
In addition, many employees will not sue their
106
employers for unpaid wages for fear of retaliation.
Knowing that even small-dollar wage claims are important to lowwage workers, that illegal payroll practices can produce big aggregate
cost savings for employers, that bringing a wage payment suit can be
expensive, and that without the threat of enforcement, scofflaw
companies have strong incentives to violate the law, Congress and the
California legislature provided that wage claims could be brought as
class actions so that the hundreds of employees all subject to the same
illegal practices could spread the litigation costs across their
107
aggregated damages. Without the collective action procedure,
individual workers would not easily find lawyers willing to handle
complex, document-intensive, and often difficult to prove litigation
with small potential recoveries, and companies would have little
incentive to comply with wage laws.
Relying on a declaration in a similar suit from the former chief
counsel of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
(DLSE), the California Supreme Court also noted that forcing
individual employees to present individual wage claims through the
state agency’s administrative proceedings “would obviously be
extremely inefficient as compared to a single class action” and “would
108
simply outstrip the resources of the DLSE.” Between 2009 and
2010, the division’s Bureau of Field Enforcement issued 3,534
citations for labor law violations; its Economic Employment
109
Enforcement Coalition issued 833. With a small staff of lawyers and
investigators, even a relatively well-established agency like
California’s DLSE cannot investigate, process, and prosecute the
thousands of incidents of wage payment violations that occur every

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 565–66.
107. Id. at 565.
108. Id. at 569.
109. 2010 BUREAU OF FIELD ENFORCEMENT
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/BOFE-2010.pdf.

ANN.

REP.

2–3,

available

at
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110

year. The number of federal wage inspectors declined by nearly a
third between 1980 and 2007, even as the labor force grew by over
111
fifty percent. Wage theft—the failure to pay earned wages—is a
112
huge problem in certain segments of the economy. A 2008 national
study of low-wage work in three major American cities found more
than two-thirds of the 4,000 employees surveyed reported at least one
113
wage payment violation in the previous week.
The class action is an integral part of the enforcement scheme
under both state and federal wage and hour law. In an area of law
beset by under enforcement, especially in low-wage sectors, to remove
the class action would be to eliminate the only effective mechanism
for effectuating these statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s opinions for the same five-Justice majority in WalMart and AT&T are premised on a frank hostility to class actions and
an expressed desire to protect big business. As he stated, adopting the
position urged in the amicus brief filed by the Chamber of
114
Commerce,
big class actions “greatly increase[] risks to
115
defendants.” The size of a class action, of course, is a function of the
size of the defendant. For big companies that are alleged to have
violated the law in ways that affect their thousands or millions of
employees or customers, the aggregate damages are very substantial.
But big is not necessarily bad. Some critics fear that unscrupulous
plaintiffs’ lawyers use class action suits as devices to extort a
settlement that benefits class counsel but provides little benefit to
individual class members. The solution to the problem of abuses of
settlement class actions, however, is to increase scrutiny of the fairness
of settlements rather than to impose huge barriers to class actions in

110. See Limor Bar-Cohen & Deana Carillo, Labor Law Enforcement in California, 1979–
2000, in THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR (2002), available at http://escholarship.org
/uc/item/59c025gh.
111. RUTH MILKMAN, ANA GONZALEZ & VICTOR NARRO, WAGE THEFT AND
WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS IN LOS ANGELES 56 (2010).
112. See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA (2008).
113. ANNETTE BERNHARDT, ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009), available at
http://www.unprotectedworkers.org/index.php/broken_laws/index (last visited October 29,
2011).
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the first place.
From the legal process perspective, the activism of these two
decisions is stunning. In Wal-Mart, the Court interpreted a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure to virtually eliminate employment
discrimination class actions notwithstanding the lack of such an intent
in the Rules or by Congress. In AT&T, the Court effectively ignored
explicit language in the Federal Arbitration Act providing that
arbitration clauses are not to be enforced where state law makes them
unenforceable.
The practical effect of these rulings is to protect corporations from
class actions in both the employment and consumer contexts. The
victors in these cases were Wal-Mart and AT&T, two of the largest
corporations in the world. The losers were not just the women who
work at Wal-Mart and the consumers who bought cell phone service
from AT&T on the promise that the phones would be free. Ultimately,
the losers will be those hurt in the future because big corporations
know that they do not have to worry about class action suits if they
impose a relatively small loss on a large number of people.

